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 This article is an attempt by the author to analyze the development of the Hokkaido 
Takusyoku Ginko ( Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank. Abb. Takugin ) as a city bank during the 
rapid growth era with an emphasis on the changes of the bank’s business model1. 
Though this analysis, the following points will be made clear as the most important 
features of the business activities of Takugin : the strongly upward inclination as a city 
bank and one to get out of Hokkaido Region. 
 The conculusiton of this article is following. In 1950s, Takugin based it’s business on 
the importance of Hokkaido as a supplier of natural resources to Honsyu region. In 
addition, the bank tried to increase the amount of it’s own deposits enough to be a 
member of city banks. But, in the late 1950s, the importance of Hokkaido as a supplier 
of natural resources became decreased because of the ‘ revolution of energy ‘ , the bank 
gradually left Hokkaido behind and tried to change it’s business model into the model 
based on the dealings with the big business and their small and medium sized firms in 
Honsyu. But, as other city banks had already formed their Keiretsu based on their 
sock-holdings and loans completely from the 1950s to the early 60s, Takugin wasn’t able 
to form it’s own Keiretsu based on the dealings with the big business enough. As a result, 
from the middle of the 1960s to the 1970’s, the bank’s model of business was forced to be 
changed into the one that was based on the dealings with small and medium-sized firms 
in Honsyu. Thus, the bank’s basement of business became vulnerable, and the bank 
faced the situation that it had too much amount of deposits to invest or to loan in the 
middle of the 1970s. This situation became one of the important historical premise that 
Takugin was strongly absorbed in it’s activities of speculations during the era of ‘The 
bubble economy‘  from the middle of 1980 to the early 1990s as the most important 
reason for the bankruptcy of the bank in 1998. Thus, we can find the strongly upward 
inclination as a city bank and one to get out of Hokkaido Region in the activities of 
Takugin during the rapid growth era. Those are the most important factors that made 
the business of the bank unstable. 
 The researches on the Japanese City Banks have been done focused on the 6 biggest 
                                                  
1 The definition of the concept, ‘business model ‘ in this article is the structure of 
business dealings which is the main basis of banking business(eg.Ogawa Isao[2006]).     
 2  city banks with stresses on the formation of Keiretsu or the Main Bank System2. Thus, 
there is almost no research on the business activities of the city-banks as Takugin in the 
lower rank. The exclusive study on the bank during the rapid growth era is the 70th 
anniversary book by the bank3. But, there is a limit in the book that an analysis on the 
historical changes of the bank’s business models isn’t observed. In addition, there are 
two other studies on the reason for the bankruptcy of the bank4. However, these studies 
focus on the strategy or corporate governance during the era from 1980s to 1990s. I 
think we need a historical analysis on the premise on the business situation of Takugin 
during the ‘ bubble economy ‘ , if we want to understand the reason for the bankruptcy 
of the bank deeply. Besides, there is other study on the finance for the development of 
Hokkaido by the governance5. But, the management of the bank during the rapid 
growth era isn’t analyzed in the study. In addition, the relationship between the 
performance of Takugin and the industrial policies in the rapid growth era is also one of 
the important subjects in this article6. However, the insistence that the industrial 
policies are just the most important factor in the performances of Banks in and after the 
rapid growth era, doesn’t get out of the range of hypothesis. In fact, there is a need to 
make clear this insistence by analyzing the way of activities of each bank during the era 
from 1950s to 1980s empirically. Thus, to analyze the feature of the way of the activities 
of Takugin is one of the most important subjects in this article. And it will be made clear 
that Takugin’s stongly and aggressively upward inclination formed in the rapid growth 
era amplified the maladjustment to the change of the business environment of finance, 
and this is one of the most important reasons for the bankruptcy of Takugin.   
  The attempt of this paper isn’t researched in the studies described above. I think it is 
important to research a historical premise that Takugin was forced to fail to survive in 
the late 1990s, because the bankruptcy of the bank is one of the most important affairs 
in the history of the Postwar Japanese Economy. In addition, This attempt with the 
point of view of ‘ periphery ‘will contribute to a trend of historical research that has 
                                                  
2 The Hosei University’s Center for industrial information, Hashimoto Juro and Takeda 
Haruhito ( eds. ) (1992) ; Okazaki Tetsuji (1995 ) ; Kikkaaw Takeo and Kato Kenta 
( 1996 ) ; Masahiko Aoki and Hue Patrick ( eds. ) ( 1994 ) ; Hidaka Chikage (2000) ; 
Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap (2001). 
3 Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko ( 1971 ).   
4 The Hokkaido Newspaper Company ( ed. ) ( 1999 ) ; Hattori Yasuhiko ( 2003 ) . 
Hattori’s discussion on the management of Takugin during the rapid growth era 
entirely depends on the discussion of Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko (1971). Thus, he 
doesn’t analyze the management of the bank by using historical archives 
5 KOISO Syuji ( 2005 ).   
6 NAKABAYASHI Masaki (Osaka Univ.) gave me a comment on this point based on the 
insistence of Hoshi & Kashyap (2001) pp.205-206. 
 3  attempt to revision the main trend of historical studies that deal with the history of the 
center as their main theme7. 
  In this paper, I can use some business archives of Takugin which have been donated to 
the Historical Museum of Hokkaido. Those archives include only the archives 
concerning the Presidents of the bank, the first and second plans for the long-term 
business, and the books of statistics on the business of the bank. The other business 
archives of the bank excluding those above have been held by The RCC. Thus, I can’t 
use such archives. It  is impossible for researchers to use the archives donated to the 
Historical Museum of Hokkaido by the bank excluding those described above for forty 
years from 19988. Those archives are not used in this paper either. To overcome this 
limit as much as possible, in addition to some archives published by Takugin, for 
example, the bank’s financial statements, the Reckons by the Presidents of the bank 
which appeared in newspapers is used in this paper.   
 
1. The relationship between the Takugin’s business strategy and the importance of 
Hokkaido as a supplier of natural resources to Honsyu. 
(1) The Importance of Hokkaido as a supplier of natural resources to Honsyu in the 
early 1950’s 
 In this passage, the process of Hokkaido to become an important supplier of Natural 
resources to Honsyu is observed briefly9, because we need this discussion to understand 
the Takugin’s model of Business during the era of the early 1950s.   
 After the World War II, Japan lost all the colonies and occupied areas. Thus, Japan 
expected Hokkaido as an important supplier of natural resources, for example, coals, 
foods, timbers. In this situation, Hokkaido and the ministries of the central government 
concerned began to form the plan for exploiting Hokkaido. As a result, the first 5 year’s 
General Plan for exploiting Hokkaido is formed formally and embarked. According to 
the plan, 1300 hundred million Yen would be spent on the infrastructures and 
expansion of production in Hokkaido, for example, agriculture, hydroelectoricity, coal 
mining, timbers. Especially, the amounts of cultivated lands, milk cows, fishery, 
hydroelectoricity, populations are planed to be increased from 128% to 217% during the 
era from 1951 fiscal year to 1956 fiscal year. 
  However, the amount of money actually spent is only 700 hundred million Yen, 60% of 
the amount of the Plan. Thus, the items whose amounts of aims are realized are only 
                                                  
7 Oue Shinobu et. al. ( eds ) ( 1992 ) ; Nakanishi Satoru ( 1998 ). 
8 The Historical Museum of Hokkaido ( 2000 ), pp. 73-77. 
9 The following discussion depends on Hokkaido Prefecture ( ed ) (1977). 
 4  productions of thermal power , milk, timber (Respectively 192%, 234%, 5793%. In the 
plan, respectively 126%, 217%, 155%). But, increasing amount of spending on public 
undertakings in Hokkaido during the era from 1952 fiscal year to 1956 fiscal year is 
larger than that of the entire nation. This fact shows the high expectation against 
Hokkaido as supplier of natural resources.   
 
(2) Takugin’s business model during the first half of the 1950s. 
 Takugin, which became a commercial bank during the same era, also tried to form it’s 
new business model according to the situation of the time. The first feature of the model 
is that the bank increased the branches in the area of Tokyo to correspond to not only 
the needs to lone the companies which do their own business in Hokkaido, but also the 
flows of money between Honsyu and Hokkaido based on the flows of products from 
Hokkaido to Honsyu. The second feature is that the bank tried to bring up Hokkaido 
Bank, a regional bank newly established in the early 1950s by giving it’s thirteen 
branches to that bank to foster the economic development of Hokkaido inside10. 
  Concerned with the former, the following comment is described in a business Archive of 
Takugin11. ‘ After the defeat of the War, the economic position of Hokkaido in Japan 
became more and more important. Thus, the economy of Hokkaido has to be integrated 
to the economy of Honsyu more storongly. According to this situation, Takugin must 
foster the flows of products and money between Hokkaido and Honsyu from the point of 
view of national economy, and contribute to the economic development of Hokkaido.’ ‘By 
increasing number of the branches in Honsyu, we can contribute to the development of 
firms in Hokkaido with giving credit to them or with show them criterions for judging 
creditability of firms in Honsyu, when they deal with firms there. Please understand 
that the aim of this business strategy including increasing our amount of deposits is to 
foster the development of industries in Hokkaido.’ This quotation shows that for the 
purpose of   contributing to the economic development of Hokkaido, Takugin tried to 
give credits or information on firms in Honsyu to firms in Hokkaido, and by doing those 
things the bank also tried to foster the flow of money and products between Hokkaido 
and Honsyu. 
 In fact, Takugin increased the branches in Honsyu, especially in Tokyo during the 
early 1950s ( Table 1 ). HIROSE Keiichi, the president of the bank in those days, 
reckoned ‘ when we opened Tsukiji Branch in 1947, our third branch in Tokyo, GHQ 
                                                  
10 Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko ( 1971 ) p. 320.   
11 ‘ The age of the president HIROSE ‘, one of the business archives of Takugin donated 
by the bank to the Historical Museum of Hokkaido. 
 5  made us hold a public hearing. Many people came to the hearing, and some people 
opposed the open of our branch. I said ‘the half amount of fishes arrived at Tsukiji come 
from Hokkaido. ’The open of our branch at Tsukiji should be accepted ‘ . As a result, the 
open of our branch became permitted by GHQ12. In addition, when NAGATA Masataku, 
the former president to HIROSE, was asked where the coal mining companies are 
loaned, he answered the companies had been loaned in Tokyo for the era from 1945 to 
the late 1960s13. The validity of the discussions on the flows of money and products 
described above are proved with the quotations above. Besides, the ratio on the amount 
of the loans in Hokkaido against all loans is still higher. This fact shows Hokkaido is 
very important as the basement of the business of the bank. Moreover, the industries 
loaned by Takugin are mainly consisted of coal mining, steel, timber, fisheries, which 
are the main industries in Hokkaido. It is described in Takugin’s financial statement 
that the bank loaned the companies in Tokyo belonging to those industries described 
above. This description is consist with Nagata’s reckon quoted above. 
  There is a following description on the second feature. ‘ In order to realize the smooth 
finance in Hokkaido region, we must try to cooperate with the other banks in Hokkaido 
more and more.  Hokkaido Bank, which was newly established in March 1951, has 
tried to expand it’s network of branches especially for small and medium-sized firms 
since it’s establishment. The Bank has 41 branches, but it is not enough for the bank to 
cooperate with us to attain the aim described above. We, Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank, 
have to bring up banks in Hokkaido as well as possible. Thus, we make the decision to 
give Hokkaido Bank a small part of our branches, and to cooperate with the Bank’. In 
short, this description above shows that if Takugin accepted a role as an important 
financer for the dealing between Hokkaido and Honsyu, Hokkaido Bank did a role as an 
important financer for small and medium-sized firms in Hokkaido, the two banks could 
finance to develop Hokkaido economy more efficiently14. 
 We can conclude the feature of the model of business of Takugin during this period as 
such. Takugin attached more importance to dealings between Honsyu and Hokkaido 
than dealings in Hokkaido according to the increasing importance of Hokkaido as a 
supplier of natural resources. On the other hand, the Bank also made the decision to 
give Hokkaido Bank a small part of it’s branches. Takugin tried to enforce the ability to 
finance for the demand concerning Hokkaido. Based on this model of business, Takugin 
                                                  
12 HIROSE ‘ Watakushi no rirekisyo ( my own personal history ) ‘ The Nikkei Shinbun 
News Paper September, 1968. 
13 ‘ The age of the President HIROSE, one of the business archives of Takugin donated 
by the bank to the Historical Museum of Hokkaido. 
14 Hokkaido Takusyoku ginnko(1971) p. 319.   
 6  tried to foster the development of Hokkaido’s economy and Takugin itself. 
 
2. The Change of the development policy of Hokkaido, Takugin’s development as a city 
bank and advance into Honsyu region 
(1) The energy revolution and the decline of Hokkaido as a supplier of natural resources 
  From the late 1950s, the position of Hokkaido as a supplier of natural resources began 
to decline because of the affection of the energy revolution15. The second plan on the 
development of Hokkaido, which was begun from 1960, proves this fact. The first plan 
attached more importance to the exploitation of natural resources and the investment 
on agriculture than the second plan. The second plan attached more importance to 
attracting industries and public investment to foster the development of industries, for 
example, expansions of roads and ports. 
 The second plan also included the development of mining, especially coal mining 
(12.5% increase), timber and fishery (5.1% increase including agriculture). The result 
based on an amount of money was larger than the plan excluding population, the second 
industries. However, the coals were planed to be used by the industries in Hokkaido 
because of the affections of the energy revolution. In addition, the amount of the 
production of coal in Hokkaido during the period from 1960 to 1970 increased only from 
10 million tons to 20 million tons. As a result, because of declining of the coal mining 
industry in Hokkaido, the change of number of employees from 1960 to 1970 also 
declined from 111 thousands to 53 thousands. The decreasing number of employee in 
1970 surpassed the number of the plan, in which the number during the same period 
changed from 111 thousands to 87 thousands. The situation in the timber industry was 
the same as that of coal mining. The amount of production of timber was planed to 
increase from 10400 thousands miters cubed to 14100 thousands miters cubed. But, in 
fact, the amount was increased to 12600 miters cubed. Though the numbers of 
employees was planed to increase from 59 thousands to 64 thousands, in fact, the 
number was decreased from 59 thousands to 40 thousands. The amount of the second 
industries, which is very important in the second plan, were not attained excluding 
productions of cements and papers. From this brief analysis, we can make sure that the 
economy of Hokkaido, where Coal mining, agriculture, fishery, timber ware main 
industries, began to decline during the rapid growth era.   
 
(2) The beginning of the change of Takugin’s business model 
  During the same period, Takugin’s business model began to change. First, Takugin got 
                                                  
15 Shin-pen Hokkaido-shi No. 6 pp. 386-453. 
 7  out of the regional banks’ association, and chose the way to becoming a member of city 
banks. When Takugin made the decision, the manager of the bank gave all the staff a 
notification in which it was written that if the bank chose the way to developing as a 
commercial bank, we have to come within the national range and to got such a scale as 
city banks. However, it was also written in the same notification that the bank thought 
fostering an economic development of Hokkaido as one of the most important task. 
According to Table 1, the loans-in-Hokkaido ratio decreased slightly. Besides, the bank’s 
composition of loans didn’t change. These facts show that Takugin’s strategy described 
above is true. 
  Because Takugin became a member of city banks, the bank had to get a larger scale of 
management, especially larger amount of deposit. The President Hirose said to the staff 
repeatedly that we must get more and more amount of deposit16. These facts shows that 
the bank gradually became more and more interested in getting larger amount of 
deposit than interested in fostering the economic circulation between Honsyu and 
Hokkaido to contribute to the economic development of Hokkaido. In 1960 the first five 
years long-term management plan was embarked. The most important aim in the plan 
was to get such larger amount of deposit as close to city banks’ average amount of 
deposits and deposit per head as possible. Takugin’s share of deposit in the total amount 
of city banks’ deposits declined from 3.56% to 3.33% during the era from 1955 to 1959. 
Takugin’s deposit per head was 70% of average amount of city Banks. Takugin thought 
that the bank had to get over it’s inferiority. These facts show that the bank became 
caught in a strongly upward orientation as a member of city banks. 
 From this era, Hokkaido Bank, which Takugin tried to bring up, began to try to 
increase the amount of its deposit17. The president Shimamoto directed the bank to 
increase the amount of its deposit from 48,692 millions Yen in the end of March 1961 to 
100,000 millions Yen in the end of March 1965. The direction almost came true in the 
end of March 1964. Further, the bank made the plan to increase its deposit up to 
300,000 millions Yen until the end of March 1971. This plan came true in the end of 
November 1971. Moreover, the bank tried to increase the amount of its deposit during 
the 1970s. As a result, the shares of Hokkaido Bank in the deposit market in Hokkaido 
increased from 10.9% in the end of 1955 to 22.8% in the end of 1970. On the contrary, 
those of Takugin fall from 53.1% in the end of 1955 to 48.8% in the end of 1970. The 
competition in the deposit market in Hokkaido, especially in Sapporo, became keener 
                                                  
16 ‘The age of the President Hirose’, included among the business archives of Takugin. 
17 Hokkaido Bank(1983). The data of the shares in the deposit market of Hokkaido were 
calculated from Hokkaido financial section ‘ Monthly statement on the finance in 
Hokkaido’ various months. 
 8  because of the increase of branches of various sorts of the banks. This fact shows that 
Hokkaido bank became the most important rival in the financial market of Hokkaido for 
Takugin. 
The second principal aim of the bank was a gradual expansion of the loans based on 
the existing model of business. This aim was backed up by the vice president’s direction 
22 June 1960 to the head of the inspection department18. But, this line didn’t progress 
smoothly. Rather, in the process of this aim, the change of the exiting model became 
clarified. In other words, the decline of industries of coal mining, timber, fisheries 
caused by the ‘energy revolution ‘ was made clear. According to the data on 31 March 
196219, about the half of all the delayed loans ( 413 million Yen ) was consisted of the 
three industries described above. According to the region based data, the sum and ratio 
of loans in Hokkaido occupied 256 million Yen, 62.1 % of all the loans 413 million Yen. 
Excluding the four principal cities, Sapporo, Otaru, Asahikawa, Hakodate, the sum and 
ratio of the delayed loans there did 188 million Yen, 45.6% of all the delayed loans. From 
these data, the limit of the existing model of business was backed up. 
 However, Takugin’s loans to Hokkaido’s main industries keep the same high ratios to 
all the bank’s loans, foods 6.5%, timber 6.4%, mining 6.1%20. President Tojo reckoned 
that because the bank‘s most important role was to foster the development of Hokkaido 
economy, and because coal mining was one of the most important industries in 
Hokkaido, We had to aid the coal mining companies which faced their crises of 
bankruptcies caused by the ‘energy revolution’. We were not able to act like city banks 
that were almost strangers to Hokkaido. In short, as the biggest and most important 
bank in Hokkaido, Takugin had to care for Hokkaido economy. This is the reason why 
the bank continued to loan such industries as ones described above after the ‘energy 
revolution’ appeared. But, at last, as the restructuring of the industrial structure in 
Hokkaido progressed, the ratio of loan in Hokkaido to all loan decreased, the ratio of 
loan in Honsyu increased. 
  It was very important for Takugin during the same era to advance into Honsyu region, 
especially Tokyob region. According to President Tojo21, the aim of the strategy to 
                                                  
18 ‘ Ki kou dai 263 gou ‘ included in the Takugin’s business Archives ‘ The age of the 
President Tojo’ 
19 Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginkou ‘ eigyouten seiseki gaikatsu hyou syouwa 37 nenndo 
shimoki’ 
20  Hokkaido  Takusyoku  Ginkou(1971)Table  2-3-14. Hattori points out the same point 
with using the same data ( Hattori (2004)). But, he doesn’t analyze the changes of the 
model of Takugin’s Business, and the first long-term business plan. 
21 Following discussion on Takugin’s strategy based on Tojo ‘ Toudori 15 ne-n (my 15 
years as the president of Takugin ) in Hokkaido shinbun (The Hokkaido News Paper ) 
 9  develop branches there was as follows. In response to the situation that an excess of 
exports over imports in the dealings between Honsyu and Hokkaido changed into an 
excess of imports, it became necessary for the bank to develop it’s branches in Tokyo, 
where was the most important place for Hokkaido’s imports and exports. This means 
that the situation around Takugin’s model of business during the 1950s changed during 
the 1960s. In fact22, amount of the imports and exports between Honsyu and Hokkaido 
were 5,018 thousands ton and 12,111thousands ton in 1953 respectively, 12,870 
thousands ton and 26,005 thousands ton in 1965 respectively, 24,763 thousands and 
29,474 thousands ton in 1970 respectively. The export and imports of 1965 are 2.56 and 
2.14 times as much as those of 1953 respectively. The same points of 1970 are 1.13 and 
1.88 times as much as those of 1970 respectively. The explanation by Tojo described 
above is made in the middle of the 1970s, and the data on the imports exports quoted 
above are amount-based. Thus, I can’t prove Tojo’s explanation enough. However, the 
growth of the imports is over that of the exports. Thus, the importance of the exports 
declined more than that of the imports. Takugin’s strategy described above is in 
response to the change the situation of the circulation between Honsyu and Hokkaido. 
This is the first aim of the strategy.   
 The second aim of the strategy is to increase the amount of deposits. According to 
Tojo 23, the development of the branches brought new customers living around the new 
branches to Takugin. As a result, the amount of deposits increased. Because it was 
necessary for Takugin to catch up with city banks, it was also necessary for the bank to 
increase the amount of the deposits as much as possible. Thus, the development of the 
branches was in response to this task. This is the second aim of the strategy. 
 Besides, Takugin began to regard it’s dealings with foreign exchanges as importance 
during the same era. President Tojo explained the reason for the internationalization of 
the bank as follows. Because Hokkaido was a part of Japan, which had to foster her 
internationalization, the bank also had to contribute to fostering the expansion of 
regional firms’ dealings with foreign countries. As known well, as soon as the 1960s 
began, the liberalization of dealing with foreign exchanges progressed. As a result, the 
importance of the dealings for Takugin increased24. Takugin perceived this situation. 
Thus, the bank had to grow out of the second class foreign exchange banks. The bank 
                                                                                                                                                  
January 8 1978.   
22 Hokkaido ‘ Dai 62 kai Hokkaido toukeisyo dai ni kan (‘The 62th statistics book on 
Hokkaido vol. 2, March 1958’) ; ‘ Dai 75 kai Hokkaido toukeisyo (‘The 75th statistics book 
on Hokkaido’, March 1968) ; Dai 79 kai    Hokkaido toukeisyo (‘ The 79th statistics book 
on Hokkaido’). 
23 ‘ Toudori 15 ne-n ( the same archive as note no. 19 ).   
24 ‘Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko(1971) ‘ pp. 425-427. 
 10 demand the MOF (Ministry of Finance ) a liberalization of the banking regulations 
concerning foreign exchange at a time of August 1960. In addition, there were only two 
branches inside Hokkaido among the 15 branches that were permitted dealings with 
foreign exchange by MOF during the era from 1956 to 196925. In this meaning, we 
should say that to grow amount of dealing with foreign exchanges was one of the 
important aims of the strategy of the development of the branches in Tokyo. The facts 
described above show that Takugin attached more importance of dealings with foreign 
exchange to an expansion of a business chance for the bank than to fostering the 
economic development of Hokkaido. This discussion is not the same as the explanation 
by President Tojo described above. Takugin was able to increase the amount of it’s 
dealing with foreign exchanges from 10 thousands dollars to 30 thousands dollars. 
  Next, we should analyze the economic performances of the branches in Honsyu Region 
including the newly established ones during the same era. These branches didn’t 
perform well. The data of the era from October 1960 to March 1961 will be shown26. The   
branches in Honsyu among the 24 branches whose marginal loan deposit ratios were 
above 100% include Tokyo branch ( No deposit ), Kitahama branch (declining it’s 
amount of deposits ), Marunouchi branch (317.4%), Osaka branch(314.6%), Nagoya 
branch (117.4%), Kyoto branch (111.6%), shin-jyuku branch (392.9%), Tsukiji 
branch(296.7%), Nanba branch(209.5%), Nagoya ekimae branch(115.1%). Among these 
branches, the worst branches under lower 20th rank whose increasing deposits ratio to 
the era from April 1960 to September 1960 included Kobe ( -2.8% ), Kitahama (0.8%), 
Marunouchi (2.8%), Tokyo (0%), Tsukiji (3.1%), Namba (3.4%). The worst 76 branches in 
increasing deposits ratio to the same era included 9 branches in Honsyu, Tokyo (1.5%), 
Marunouchi (-6.6%), Tsukiji (-3.3%), Toranomon (0.2%), Shin-jyuku (3.1%), Yokohama 
(7.1%), Nanba (-21.6%), Kitahama (1.5%), Kobe (0.3%). These facts show the most 
important reason for the high loan deposit ratio of the branches in Honsyu was their 
weak abilities to absorb deposits. In addition, Tokyo branch occupied 187 million Yen of 
445 million Yen, all delayed loans of the branches whose deleted loan was over 500 
million Yen. Further, there were 5 branches in Honsyu, Kyoto (-71.9%), Asakusa 
(-245.0% ), Tsukiji ( -133.0% ), Nanba (-116.1% ), Ueno (-39.3%)  among all the 20 
branches whose ratio of increasing receiving exchange to the former year was under 
15.2%. There were 3 branches in Honsyu, Kobe ( -22.2% ), Ueno ( -54.1% ), Nanba 
( -21.6% ) among all the 20 branches of the same ratio as described above. Furthermore, 
                                                  
25 Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko(1971)’ Table 2-3-15 ( p. 428 ). 
26 The data shown below depend on Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginkou ‘ Eigyo-ten seiseki 
gaikatsu hyou ( The overall data on the performances of all branches of Takugin ) ‘ the 
business archives of Takugin.   
 11 there were 4 branches in Takugin which declined the amount of dealings with foreign 
exchanges. The 4 branches were Marunouchi (-2.4%), Nagoya (-10.2%), Osaka (-2.6%), 
Kitahama ( -20.8% ), all were in Honsyu. Still more, there were 10 branches in Honsyu 
among the worst 39 branches those had the highest deposit cost ratio of all the branches 
of Takugin. The 10 Branches described above were Kyoto ( 2.43% ), Kobe ( 2.33% ), 
Kitahama ( 2.01% ), Asakusa ( 2.10% ), Shinjyuku ( 2.37% ), Nagoya ( 2.02% ),Osaka, 
Marunouchi, Tsukiji, Ueno ( No data described in the archive ). There were also 9 
branches in Honsyu among the worst 22 branches in the degree of contributing to the 
profit of Takugin. The 9 branches described above were Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kitahama, 
Nagoya, Asakusa, Shinjyuku, Bakuro-cho, Irifune ( No data described in the archive ). 
These facts show that the branches of the bank in Honsyu didn’t perform well.   
 Lastly, the expansion of the Scale of Takugin is compared with other city banks 
according to Table. 3. Here, the data of March 1955, 1960 and 1965 are analyzed. First, 
the data of the Table show that Takugin was one of the smallest banks of the city banks. 
However, the changing ratio shows all the heads but increasing deposits were improved 
compared with other city banks when the era from March 1960 to March 1965 came. To 
my regret, the reason why such a phenomenon occurred is unknown. But, as discussed 
above, the delayed loans occurred because of declining of the industries in Hokkaido, 
especially coal mining, timber. Thus, Takugin had to help the industries there. During 
the same era, as far as other city banks were concerned, repayments of their loans 
began to increase27. Thus, it was impossible for Takugin to expand it’s own loans greatly 
in Honsyu. This may be one of the important reasons why the performance of Takugin 
was much less than those of other city banks. Further, Takugin’s increasing ratio of the 
amount of dealings with foreign exchanges was more than those of other city banks. The 
amount was almost 0 during the 1950s. As soon as the 1960s began, the business chance 
to expand the amount of dealing with foreign exchanges became open to Takugin 
because of the liberalization of dealing with foreign exchanges. As a result, the bank 
was able to expand the amount. This is the reason why such a result occurred. But, 
comparing with other city banks, the amount of Takugin was far away from their 
amounts. At a time of the settlement of accounts March 1965, the profit from dealing 
with foreign exchanges is 118 million Yen, 0.4% of gross profit 28,955 million Yen28. So, 
we must pay attention to the fact that the profit from foreign exchanges wasn’t 
important for Takugin.   
 In conclusion, Takugin’s business model was forced to change according to the change 
                                                  
27 SHIRATORI Keishi (2005)   
28 ‘ Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginkou(1971)‘ an appendix data.   
 12 of industrial structures in Hokkaido. Thus, in response to the change of circulations 
between Honsyu and Hokkaido, Takugin attached more importance to the development 
of branches in Honsyu, especially around Tokyo. In addition, the bank tried to expand 
it’s amount of dealing with foreign exchanges in response to the liberalization of foreign 
exchange in the beginning of the 1960s. But, such businesses didn’t contribute to the 
expanding profit of Takugin enough. In this meaning, the development of branches in 
Honsyu didn’t succeed and was not able to become an important basis for the profit of 
Takugin. 
 
3．Expansion and becoming a financer for small and medium sized firms during the  
era from the middle of the 1960s to the middle of the 1970s 
  Then, how did Takugin try to resolve these problems of its own management described 
above? This problem will be analyzed below29. 
  From 1966 to 1970, the bank had carried the second 5 years plan of the management to 
effect. In the plan, it was one of the most important aims for the bank to increase 
deposits to catch up with other city bank. This was able to be confirmed by the new 
year’s statements by President Tojo during the era of the plan. The second important 
aim was to get deposits enough to accept the national governmental bonds. During the 
same period, total demand control policy with issuing the bonds by Japanese 
Government was done too. Takugin saw this economic situation as one of the new 
important business chance. In connection with increasing deposits of the bank, the 
number of the branches around Tokyo was increased aggressively. There were many 
branches whose performances were not good described above. In other archive, there 
are branches under construction to absorb more amount of depsits, which will be in 
operation during the era of the second 5 years plan of the management. Thus, it was 
estimated that this branch policy aimed at compensating less amount of deposits per a 
branch with the increasing number of the branches. 
  It was one of the important issues for Takugin to reform the structure of loans. It was 
assumed in the plan that the stances of the banks to loan and those of the firms to raise 
funds didn’t change30. On the basis of this assumption, Takugin’s deviation from the 
average of city banks in March, 1970 was shown. According to the data, the bank tried 
                                                  
29 Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginkou ‘ dai niji cyouki keikaku no gaiyou’ ( The outline of the 
second plan for the management ), included in the business archive ‘ Tojo Takei Toudori 
jidai ( the age of the President Tojo ).   
30 Hokkaido Takusyoku bank ‘ Syowa 40/9 cyouki keikaku ‘ yu-shi kouzou’ sakutei 
sankou shiryou ( The data for changing the structure of the loans in the second 
management plan ).   
 13 to change it’s structure of loans. According to the data on March 1964, the loans of the 
bank consisted of manufacturer ( 34.4% ), commerce ( 32.3% ). Those of the average of 
city bank consisted of manufacturer ( 49.4% ) and commerce ( 31.7% ). Takugin 
forecasted it’s situation on March 1970. According to the data, Takugin’s ratio of loans to 
manufacturer would change to 32 to 38 %, the ratio of loans to commerce would change 
to 25 to 32 %. City banks’ ratio of loans to manufacturer would change to 31 to 54 %, the 
ratio of loans to commerce would change to 24 to 31 %.   
 On the basis of this estimation, Takugin made a policy to reinforce the expansion of 
dealings with firms around Tokyo, especially big firms31. There was an instruction to 
Tokyo Branch that the branch should expand the dealings with firms, especially 
dealings with big firms there, cooperating with branches of the Bank around there. This 
instruction shows that the branches had to contribute to reforming the structure of the 
bank by expanding the dealings with the big firms including ones with no business 
connection with Hokkaido. In addition, the bank also made a policy to expand dealings 
with foreign exchanges of Big Sogo Syosya, for example, Mitsui bussan and Mitsubishi 
syoji. Now, it is possible to use the data of Mitsui bussan until September, 197032. The 
amount of dealings with foreign exchanges by Mitsui bussan was increased from 18,986 
million Yen to 88,162 million Yen during the era from September 1966 to September 
1970. The increasing ratio is 364.3%. The amount of Takugin’s dealing with foreign 
exchanges of Mitsui Bussan during the same era increased from 106 million Yen to 921 
million Yen. The increasing ratio is 768.8%. The share of the bank increased from 0.55% 
to 1.04%. The increasing ratio of the bank is eminent in Mitsui Bussan’s total increasing 
ratio. Thus, it is possible to confirm the effect of the branches of the bank around Tokyo. 
However, though the branches endeavored, the share of the bank was only about 1% 
September 1970. This fact shows there was a big limit on the endeavors of the branches 
of the bank.   
 In addition, among the branches around Tokyo, the branches whose mission was only 
to loan ( Tokutei-ten ) were Tokyo Branch and Marunouch Branch, and the ones whose 
mission was more important to loan than to absorb deposits ( jyun-tokutei-ten) were 
Tsukiji branch, Bakuro-cho branch, Torano-mon branch, Kanda branch, Ueno branch, 
Asakusa branch, Yokohama Branch, Shinjyuku Branch, Shibuya branch, Ikebukuro 
Branch. These branches were directed by the President to expand their loans. Besides, 
among the branches excluding ones around Tokyo, the jyun-tokutei-ten were 
                                                  
31 Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank ‘ dai 2 ji cyouki keikaku ten betsu shiji bun ( Honsyu bun) 
(The instructions concerning the second long-term management plan to the brunches in 
Honsyu ) included in Tojo Takei Toudori jidai.   
32 Mitsui Bussan ‘ Yu-ka syoken houkokusyo ( the financial statements ) ‘ both periods. 
 14 Nagoya-eki-mae branch, Nanba branch, Kobe branch, Kyoto branch. The branches 
around Nagoya were directed to expand their loans to Toyota and the small and medium 
sized firms concerned. The ones around Osaka were directed to expand loans to the 
Kansai electric power co. and small and medium sized firms superior. These facts show 
that the estimation described above to raise the ratio to loan to manufacturers was 
based on the loans to big firms and small and medium sized firms concernd in Honsyu. 
 Further 33 , among the branches in Hokkaido, Tokutei-ten were the main store, 
Hakodate branch, Muroran branch, Asahikawa branch, Obihiro branch, Kushiro branch, 
Jyun-tokutei-ten were Sapporo higashi branch, Sapporo Minami branch, Sapporo 
ekimae branch, Hakodate ekimae branch, Otaru dai-ni branch, Tomakomai branch, 
Kitami branch. In the directions to these branches, the situation of the branches 
excluding the ones around Sapporo couldn’t be almost improved because of the declines 
of such industries as coal mining, timber. On the basis of these directions, these 
branches were directed to expand their loans to consumers such as housing loans and 
the function to consult on management problem mainly for small and medium sized 
firms34. 
 The second long-term management plan was different from the first long-term 
management plan in the point that the former included the aim at changing the 
structure of loans to industries. In short, the bank attempted to expand the amount of 
it’s own deposits to form a basement to develop as a city bank, and form the business 
model that the loans to big firms and small and medium sized firms concerned in 
Honsyu with complementary dealings with foreign exchanges and national 
government’s bonds were increased as the basis for the profits of the bank35. However, 
the keiretsu had already almost completely formed by other city banks36. Further, the 
industrial demands for loans began to decrease. As Takugin’s amount of investment in 
stocks had been less than other city banks, the formation of keiretsu of the bank had 
been weaker than those of other city banks. These facts show that the bank wasn’t able 
to increase the amount of the loans to Heavy and chemical industries on the assumption 
concerning the financial situation of March 1964.   
  This discussion will be ascertained more deeply. According to Table 1, the values of the 
ratio of the loans in Honsyu to all the loans were increased during the era. The main 
                                                  
33 Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko ‘ Dai-ni-ji cyouki keikaku ten-betsu shiji bun ( the 
directions to each branch in Hokkaido ). 
34 Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko ‘ Dai-ni-ji cyouki keikaku no gaiyou ( the outline of the 
second long-term management plan ). 
35 Hokkaido shin-bun sya hen (1998) p.23. 
36 Kikkawa and Kato ( 1996 ).   
 15 region where the amounts of the loans were increased was the places around Tokyo37. 
Further, According to Table 3, foods industry, timber industry, regional governments 
were included among the main industries loaned by the bank. These three industries 
occupied 11.8% of all the loans. These facts show that the main industries loaned by the 
bank were still the main industries in Hokkaido. However, the same industries loaned 
by all city banks occupied only 4.7% of all the loans, other industries did 40.6%38. Next, 
the amount of the bank’s dealings with Toyota will be shown39. There is no long-term 
financial dealing between Takugin and Toyota during the era from the end of September, 
1965 to the end of September, 1975. As for short-term dealings, we can only make sure 
that Takugin had not been the main supplier. Most of the dealings had been occupied by 
Tokai Bank, Mitsui Bank, and Sanwa Bank. For example, the value of the ratio of 
occupation of the dealings by the banks was 62.5%. Furthermore, during the same 
period described above, there was no dealing between Takugin and Kansai electric 
power co. These facts show that Takugin’s restructuring of the loans in the second 
long-term management plan didn’t progress. In addition, the ratio of loans to small and 
medium sized firms was changed from 37.8% to 36.2% during the era from March 1965 
to March 1970. But, the ratio of the numbers of dealings with small and medium sized 
firms was increased from 95.6% to 98.1% during the same era. Especially, though all 
increasing numbers of all dealings of the bank were 90 thousands, those of the dealings 
with small and medium sized firms were 88 thousands. However, the available data 
shows that the ratio of the loans to consumers to all loans was increased 2.2% to 5.6% 
during the era from March 1962 to March 1970.These facts means that the aim of the 
bank at expanding the loans to big firms wasn’t almost accomplished.   
Furthermore, it is important that the increasing numbers of all dealings during the era 
from March 1970 to March 1975 became equal to those of the dealings with small and 
medium sized firms, which were 44 thousands. It is also important that the ratio of 
loans to small and medium sized firms to all loans of the bank became over 40% during 
the same era above. The ratios of all city banks’ loans to small and medium sized firms 
                                                  
37 The values of the sum and ratio of loans in the places around Tokyo to all the loans in 
Honsyu were 110,493 millions Yen (72.8%) , 218,232 millions Yen(69.4%) and 633,221 
millions Yen(80%) in the end of September 1965, 1970 and 1975 respectively. 
Furthermore, the increasing amount of the loans in the places around Tokyo occupied 
82% of the increasing amount of the loans in Honsyu during the era from the end of 
September 1965 to the end of September 1975.   
38 Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko (1971) Table 2-3-4 (p.422).   
39 Toyota Jidousya Kogyo ‘ Yukasyoken Hokokusyo’ Sept. 1965, Sept 1970, and Sept. 
1970. 
 16 were 25.6% on March 1970 and 34.3% on March 197540. However, the data of March 
1975 also includes the loans to individuals. So, this data is thought to be little above the 
amount of the loans to small and medium sized firms. Thus, the ratio of Takugin 
described above is far more than that of all city banks’. These facts show that the nature 
of the bank as a financer for small and medium sized firms was deepened. Besides, 
though the amount of the dealings with foreign exchanges was increased up to 10,768 
million Yen till March 1970, the profit from the dealings was only 286 million Yen, just 
1.0% of the ordinary profits. Even March 1975, the profit was only 1,245 million Yen, 
1.3% of the ordinary profits. The profit from the dealings with foreign exchanges was 
still negligible for the bank41. 
  Lastly, the situation of the increasing deposits is ascertained. At first, to my regret, the 
aiming amount in the second long-term management plan is unknown because of lack of 
available archives. But, at the beginning of 1969, the President Tojo said to the staff 
that the bank had to attain 7000 hundreds million Yen until the end of March 196942. 
As the amount of deposits in the end of March 1970 were 7258 hundreds Yen, at least 
the increasing deposits of the bank was smoothly got on until the time. But, though it 
was thought the aiming amount of deposits per head and aiming share of the amount of 
deposits of city banks would be attained, it was also thought that the aiming amount 
would not be attained during the era from October 1970 to March 197143. Thus, the 
drive to increase the deposits of the bank became weaker until the era. Furthermore, 
from the beginning of the 1970s, the amount of the deposits was greatly increased 
because of Inflation caused by the oil shock. As a result, the amount on September 1975 
was 2.13 times as large as that on March 1971.   
 To sum up, the aim at increasing amount of the deposits in the second long-term 
management plan was not attained. According to the recollection by Tojo after his 
retirement of the President, the bank didn’t grow as much as he thought44. As a result, 
the loan-deposits ratio, profit margin between lending and deposits, and ratio of net 
income to common stock of the bank concerned, the same levels were kept from the 
middle of the 1960s to the middle of 1970s. However, the big amount of the idle money 
was occurred (the above mentioned discussion according to Table 1)45, and the amount 
                                                  
40 The Bank of Japan ‘ Keizai Toukei Nenpo (Economic Statistics Annual ) ‘ 1970 and 
1975. 
41 Takugin ‘ Yu-ka syo-ken houkokusyo ( financial statements ) ‘. 
42 Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko ‘ Tojo Takei toudori jidai ‘ ‘ Yu-ka syo-ken houkokusyo ‘ . 
43 ‘ Hokkaido Takusyoku Ginko (1971) ‘ pp. 411-412. 
44 Tojo ‘ Toudori 15 nen ‘ No. 8. in Hokkaido Shinbun January 14 1978. 
45 In this paper, idle money was calculated as following. Idle money = deposits-(loans + 
investment in securities). 
 17 was in a direction of increasing in the middle of the 1970s. According to Table 3, the 
situation around the increasing amount of the idle money of the bank was eminent 
among those of city banks. As mentioned before, Takugin didn’t have its own keiretsu 
enough to loan or to invest in. As a result, the nature of the bank became that of a 
financer for small and medium sized firms. Thus, the bank wasn’t able to invest or to 
loan such a big amount of the idle money. This is the reason why such a situation as 
mentioned above was occurred. During the same era, the differential of the scale of 
management between Takugin and other city banks became more enlarged, this 
situation became an important problem to be solved for the bank46.  
 
Conclusion  
 Because Japan lost all its colonies and occupied areas, Hokkaido was very important 
as a supplier of natural resources. Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank formed its own business 
model that responded to a policy of national government to develop economy there and 
the increasing amounts of the circulation of money between Hokkaido and Honsyu. 
Furthermore, from the middle of 1950s on, the bank increased the number of it’s 
branches in Honsyu, especially around Tokyo to absorb money concerning developing 
Hokkaido, and the bank became a member of city banks. In this process, the bank 
needed expand the scale of the management, and took a management policy with an 
aggressively upward inclination to catch up with other city banks in the aspect of scale 
to absorb deposits and to expand the number of the branches.   
 However, after the energy revolution, because of the decline of the main industries in 
Hokkaido, especially coal mining, Timber, Takugin had to seek to form its new business 
model. Though, as the bank had to give remedies to such industries, the structure of the 
loans of the bank was not changed enough. But, after the latter half of the 1960s, 
especially during the process of the second long-term management plan, the change of 
the business model became one of the most important subjects for the bank. To put it 
concretely, the bank tried to increase the amount of deposits, loans to big firms and 
dealings with foreign exchanges in Honsyu for the purpose of making it’s own scale 
larger. However, as the formation of keiretsu by other city banks had been finished until 
the middle of the 1960s, and as the heave and chemical industries’ demands for loans 
began to decline, there was almost no room for the coming true of the aims of Takugin 
excluding the increasing amount of deposits. In addition, in the deposit market of 
                                                  
46 As well known, Takugin had taken speculative actions very aggressively since about 
1980 (The investigative committee on the loans of Takugin ‘ The report on the loans of 
Takugin ‘ in Hokkaido Newspaper ( 1999 ) pp.302-303 ).   
 18 Hokkaido, Hokkaido bank, which at first Takugin tried to bring up, tried to increase the 
amount of its own deposit from the beginning of the 1960s. Thus, Hokkaido Bank 
became the most important rival for Takugin in the financial market of Hokkaido. As a 
result, the nature of the bank as a financer for small and medium sized firms was 
intensified and the bank had big amount of idle money in the middle of the 1970s.   
 From the facts shown above, we can say the reasons for the making of such business 
model and management situation of Takugin in the middle of the 1970s as following ; 
the bank depended on the policy on the development of Hokkaido during the 1950s, and 
as latecomer to the group of city banks, the bank had to increase the amount of the 
deposits to catch up with them, further, the embarking on the changing structure of the 
loans was delayed until the middle of the 1960s because of the situation of the 
management of the bank during the 1950s. In such a situation of the management, 
Takugin with an aggressively upward inclination got absorbed in increasing the amount 
of the speculative loans greatly from the latter half of 1970s on47. Takugin’s business 
activities of speculations in the 1980, which is the most direct and most important cause 
for the bankruptcy of the bank after the bubble economy, reflected this inclination that 
was formed during the rapid growth era48. Needless to say, this is the most important 
reason for the instability of the management of the bank49 and for the bankruptcy of the 
bank after the crush of the bubble economy in Japan. Thus, in addition to the change of 
the business environment around the bank during the era from the middle of the 1950s 
to the 1960s, the aggressively upward inclination of the bank as a city bank should be 
pointed out as a historical premise on the strongly speculative actions and bankruptcy 
of the bank during the era from the 1980s to 1990s50.  
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1953.9 24,173 34,778 58,951 358 1.48% 40,417 68.6% 7,673 60,183 49,573 82.4%
1954.3 22,855 36,038 58,893 237 1.04% 39,662 67.3% 8,516 62,272 52,149 83.7%
1954.9 23,134 36,202 59,336 166 0.72% 37,981 64.0% 8,700 65,038 52,930 81.4%
1955.3 23,572 38,385 61,957 298 1.26% 40,716 65.7% 9,439 71,928 56,888 79.1%
1955.9 23,940 37,792 61,732 252 1.05% 39,934 64.7% 10,335 77,271 60,156 77.9%
1956.3 23,034 44,274 67,308 291 1.26% 43,712 64.9% 12,045 90,407 68,420 75.7%
1956.9 26,352 49,942 76,294 242 0.92% 46,758 61.3% 13,701 95,780 76,906 80.3%
1957.3 24,499 55,350 79,849 260 1.06% 48,259 60.4% 12,224 103,886 87,282 84.0%
1957.9 49,816 57,352 107,168 184 0.37% 53,624 50.0% 13,358 110,494 81,256 73.5%
1958.3 28,557 63,876 92,433 174 0.61% 59,469 64.3% 18,181 121,579 87,282 71.8%
1958.9 32,396 68,647 101,043 154 0.48% 65,738 65.1% 20,235 130,447 93,933 72.0%
1959.3 31,357 76,541 107,898 432 1.38% 70,003 64.9% 22,340 138,468 99,702 72.0%
1959.9 38,229 80,071 118,300 197 0.52% 73,321 90.5% 25,235 144,973 107,056 73.8%
1960.3 38,380 88,109 126,489 212 0.55% 79,345 62.7% 28,049 157,006 117,523 74.9%
1960.9 44,972 90,218 135,190 226 0.50% 82,556 61.1% 29,308 168,324 123,407 73.3%
1961.3 45,150 103,370 148,520 345 0.76% 91,691 61.7% 35,745 183,801 134,176 73.0%
1961.9 53,821 105,811 159,632 272 0.51% 98,118 61.5% 37,984 203,536 149,895 73.6%
1962.3 52,667 115,667 168,334 305 0.58% 104,908 62.3% 38,067 210,698 155,903 74.0%
1962.9 58,835 120,769 179,604 265 0.45% 108,645 60.5% 45,164 232,098 168,928 72.8%
1963.3 60,308 143,204 203,512 368 0.61% 123,396 60.6% 44,634 260,777 180,453 69.2%
1963.9 69,933 155,137 225,070 230 0.33% 134,323 59.7% 46,465 310,349 211,388 68.1%
1964.3 71,017 179,625 250,642 315 0.44% 149,012 59.5% 46,559 323,033 224,002 69.3%
1964.9 82,687 185,326 268,013 297 0.36% 156,653 58.4% 61,900 347,789 233,490 67.1%
1965.3 81,819 216,666 298,485 335 0.41% 174,276 58.4% 69,835 349,730 242,922 69.5%
1965.9 88,534 224,678 313,212 258 0.29% 179,516 57.3% 82,804 396,199 264,135 66.7%
1966.3 86,930 250,519 337,449 334 0.38% 195,873 58.0% 83,782 412,902 274,065 66.4%
1966.9 99,955 256,216 356,171 363 0.36% 202,274 56.8% 90,412 436,114 299,326 68.6%
1967.3 100,685 291,934 392,619 329 0.33% 227,383 57.9% 90,713 452,096 308,508 68.2%
1967.9 112,907 297,783 410,690 238 0.21% 232,633 56.6% 92,661 501,877 333,300 66.4%
1968.3 114,005 327,735 441,740 334 0.29% 251,519 56.9% 97,136 513,920 341,166 66.4%
1968.9 125,461 329,002 454,463 307 0.24% 252,572 55.6% 107,387 549,526 364,578 66.3%
1969.3 0 0.00% 281,720 55.9% 113,419 611,139 396,393 64.9%
1969.9 0 0.00% 290,184 54.1% 116,695 676,250 403,815 59.7%
1970.3 0 0.00% 325,769 54.9% 125,689 725,827 454,242 62.6%
1970.9 0 0.00% 334,955 53.1% 127,089 798,165 482,209 60.4%
1971.3 0 0.00% 371,147 52.7% 125,511 858,174 521,144 60.7%
1971.9 0 0.00% 369,261 49.6% 145,047 967,793 565,975 58.5%
1972.3 0 0.00% 434,421 49.7% 171,519 1,085,994 627,987 57.8%
1972.9 0 0.00% 446,783 46.5% 191,328 1,212,341 674,270 55.6%
1973.3 0 0.00% 514,478 45.8% 208,857 1,363,833 768,603 56.4%
1973.9 0 0.00% 533,913 44.5% 216,193 1,421,204 840,253 59.1%
1974.3 0 0.00% 593,469 45.3% 229,355 1,503,426 896,397 59.6%
1974.9 0 0.00% 606,727 44.3% 244,501 1,631,386 939,200 57.6%
1975.3 0 0.00% 664,610 45.7% 257,788 1,734,864 1,008,719 58.1%
1975.9 0 0.00% 678,530 44.9% 276,352 1,830,497 1,057,508 57.8%
Sources: Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank "Finacial statement" various periods ; Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank " Hokka



































98.0% 12.7% 132 11 5 0 -6,441 1,479 1,933 1,251 4,289 1,005 44 3,929 359 48.5% 3.7%
94.6% 13.7% 124 12 5 0 -5,137 1,438 1,937 1,328 4,642 1,095 68 4,312 329 45.8% 3.7%
91.2% 13.4% 111 12 5 0 -2,998 1,398 1,989 1,252 4,801 1,322 65 4,373 428 61.2% 3.3%
86.1% 13.1% 112 13 5 0 532 1,354 2,067 1,324 5,243 1,634 110 4,812 431 63.7% 3.0%
79.9% 13.4% 107 13 5 0 5,204 1,309 2,124 1,327 5,378 1,723 165 4,950 428 65.4% 3.1%
74.4% 13.3% 112 13 5 0 11,054 1,264 2,194 1,268 5,665 1,996 179 5,252 413 65.3%2 . 7 %
79.7% 14.3% 112 15 5 0 5,785 2,220 2,439 1,232 6,011 2,150 100 5,532 478 43.1% 2.5%
76.9% 11.8% 111 15 5 0 11,813 2,172 2,749 1,197 6,704 2,453 109 6,085 619 57.0%2 . 5 %
97.0% 12.1% 111 15 5 0 -10,032 2,110 3,073 1,417 7,214 2,733 163 6,584 630 59.7% 1.6%
76.0% 15.0% 112 16 5 0 10,965 2,045 3,347 1,599 8,091 3,107 124 7,450 640 62.6%2 . 7 %
77.5% 15.5% 111 16 5 0 9,169 2,000 3,651 1,655 8,693 3,520 140 8,037 656 65.6% 2.4%
77.9% 16.1% 111 16 5 0 8,230 4,000 3,808 1,622 9,312 3,972 102 8,611 701 35.1% 2.1%
81.6% 17.4% 112 17 6 0 1,438 4,000 4,044 1,723 9,893 4,348 111 9,184 708 35.4% 1.8%
80.6% 17.9% 112 17 8 0 2,468 4,000 4,364 1,915 10,859 4,900 3 10,130 729 36.5% 1.8%
80.3% 17.4% 112 17 9 0 3,826 4,000 4,667 2,077 11,593 5,337 5 10,846 747 37.4% 1.8%
80.8% 19.4% 112 17 9 0 -464 6,000 4,924 2,175 12,688 5,940 87 11,936 752 25.1% 1.5%
78.4% 18.7% 113 18 10 0 5,920 6,000 5,361 2,375 13,760 5,887 5 12,903 857 28.6%2 . 0 %
79.9% 18.1% 113 18 10 0 4,297 6,000 5,859 2,647 15,662 6,793 36 14,779 883 29.4% 1.8%
77.4% 19.5% 115 20 12 0 7,330 6,000 6,285 2,774 15,802 6,696 4 14,857 945 31.5%2 . 2 %
78.0% 17.1% 117 22 14 0 12,631 6,000 6,884 2,867 17,333 7,627 34 16,352 980 32.7% 1.9%
72.5% 15.0% 120 23 15 0 38,814 6,000 7,469 3,123 18,658 8,332 34 17,639 1,018 33.9% 2.0%
77.6% 14.4% 125 24 16 0 25,832 6,000 8,246 3,400 20,882 9,287 39 20,215 666 22.2% 1.8%
77.1% 17.8% 130 27 19 0 17,876 12,000 9,271 3,833 26,489 10,062 49 25,809 680 11.3% 2.0%
85.3% 20.0% 134 29 21 0 -18,590 12,000 10,110 4,060 28,955 10,845 59 28,084 870 14.5% 1.6%
79.1% 20.9% 137 31 23 0 183 12,000 10,833 4,131 30,893 11,529 58 29,919 974 16.2% 1.9%
81.7% 20.3% 142 33 25 1 -8,329 12,000 11,392 4,112 33,258 12,510 159 32,252 1,006 16.8% 1.5%
81.7% 20.7% 146 37 29 1 -10,469 12,000 12,169 4,244 35,417 13,357 89 34,402 1,014 16.9% 1.5%
86.8% 20.1% 147 38 30 1 -31,236 12,000 13,211 4,566 38,876 14,490 67 37,841 1,035 17.3% 1.3%
81.8% 18.5% 147 38 30 1 -1,474 12,000 14,296 4,887 41,519 15,214 31 40,453 1,065 17.8% 1.6%
86.0% 18.9% 146 38 30 1 -24,956 12,000 15,569 5,222 44,848 16,484 52 43,757 1,090 18.2% 1.5%
82.7% 19.5% 148 38 31 1 -12,324 12,000 16,542 5,649 49,171 17,745 440 48,056 1,114 18.6% 1.6%
82.4% 18.6% 147 39 31 1 -5,931 12,000 23,981 10,345 62 21,767 1,144 19.1% 1.8%
79.3% 17.3% 146 42 32 1 23,030 12,000 25,832 11,186 12 22,756 1,382 23.0% 1.9%
81.8% 17.3% 146 42 33 1 6,428 12,000 28,464 12,005 390 25,413 1,721 28.7% 1.5%
79.1% 15.9% 147 44 35 1 39,841 12,000 30,774 13,029 103 27,141 1,897 31.6% 2.0%
82.1% 14.6% 147 45 36 1 27,798 12,000 33,121 14,113 140 28,738 2,397 40.0% 1.8%
77.0% 15.0% 148 47 36 3 77,965 12,000 35,289 15,640 32 3,186 2,486 41.4% 1.9%
80.4% 15.8% 147 47 36 3 40,997 12,000 38,361 17,724 7 32,208 2,512 41.9% 1.7%
79.3% 15.8% 144 50 36 6 59,561 12,000 41,489 19,641 78 35,506 2,683 44.7% 1.6%
82.4% 15.3% 149 50 37 6 31,409 12,000 45,267 20,877 94 40,211 3,057 51.0% 1.4%
84.5% 15.2% 150 52 37 8 4,209 20,000 53,676 24,081 171 47,687 3,371 33.7% 1.6%
87.1% 15.3% 152 54 37 9 -34,833 20,000 69,859 28,567 29 63,401 3,409 34.1% 2.1%
83.9% 15.0% 152 54 37 9 18,261 20,000 87,563 38,355 19 80,037 2,803 28.0% 2.5%
83.8% 14.9% 152 54 37 9 23,146 20,000 92,690 41,771 76 85,129 2,983 29.8% 2.4%
82.6% 15.1% 156 57 37 12 42,903 20,000 96,290 44,137 112 83,793 3,623 36.2% 2.2%
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industries amount ratio
Food  4,518 7.6%
timber  3,575 6.0%




Food  4,147 6.2%
timber  3,970 5.9%
iron and steel  3,635 5.4%






local goverments 6,494 5.2%
total 125,989 100.0%
manufacturers 93,974 31.7%
Wholesalrs and Retailsalers 96,422 32.5%
local goverments 15,749 5.3%
total 296,593 100.0%
manufacturers 168,899 28.7%
Whokesaler and Retailsalers 217,854 37.0%




Wholesalers and Retailsalers 429,346 30.7%
constructers 86,687 6.2%
sevices 72,165 5.2%
local goverments 89,903 6.4%
total 1,399,183 100.0%
Sources : Hokkaido Takusyoku Bank 'Financial 
statements' various Years.
1970.3
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Table.3 Takugin's comparence to the other city banks
Unit : thousand millions Yen   the unit of the ratio of changes is %












the end of mar. 1955 the end of mar. 1975
deposits 141 166 55 deposits 1734 4151 1602
loans 61 134 48 loans 1453 3662 1515
foreign exchange 0.08 18 22 foreign exchange 178 730 646
securities 9 23 7 securities 257 617 243
idle money 70 9 14 idle money 23 -128 215
ordinary balance ratio 77.6% 77.85% 2.22% ordinary balance ratio 92.3% 92.2% 1.0%
Takugin's share of idle money 105.8% Takugin's share of idle money -1.4%
Takugin's share of securities invested 3.4% Takugin's share of securities invested 3.2%
Takugin's share of deposits 7.0% Takugin's share of deposits 3.2%
Takugin's share of loans 3.70% Takugin's share of loans 3.1%
the end of mar. 1960 the ratio of change(55.3 to 60.3)
deposits 157 378 162 deposits 113.4 127.7 194.5
loans 126 611 359 loans 104.2 349.5 1652
foreign exchange 0.2 64 92 securities 211.1 169.6 1214.3
securities 28 62 92 foreign exchange 157 291 143.9
idle money 2 -295 233 idle money -97.1 -337.80 156.4
ordinary balance ratio 82.87% 84.17% 1.88% ordinary balance ratio 6.8 8.3 2.2
Takugin's share of idle money -0.1% the ratio of change(60.3 to 65.3)
Takugin's share of securities invested 3.5% deposits 122.7 136.6 14.9
Takugin's share of deposits 3.2% loans 136 13 41
Takugin's share of loans 1.6% securities 146.4 141.9 -31.5
the end of mar. 1965 foreign exchange 3,550 513 921.9
deposits 349 891 368 idle money -100.00 -128.5 -14.2
loans 298 656 405 ordinary balance ratio -0.4 1.9 2.7
foreign exchange 7 150 150 the ratio of change(65.3 to 70.3)
securities 69 150 63 deposits 107.7 69.8 82.9
idle money -18 84 200 loans 99.0 99.3 42.2
ordinary balance ratio 82.51% 85.74% 2.69% securities 1685.7 64.7 -19.3
Takugin's share of idle money -1.7% foreign exchange 500.0 58.6 62
Takugin's share of securities invested 3.6% idle money -133.3 -151.2 -70.0
Takugin's share of deposits 3.0% ordinary balance ratio 6.0 0.2 34.2
Takugin's share of loans 3.8% the ratio of change(70.3 to 75.3)
the end of mar. 1970 deposits 139.2 174.3 138.0
deposits 725 1,513 673 loans 145.0 179.9 163.0
loans 593 1,308 576 securities 105.6 64.7 -19.3
foreign exchange 42 238 243 foreign exchange 323.8 206.7 165.8
securities 125 247 121 idle money 283.3 197.7 258.3
idle money 6 -43 60 ordinary balance ratio 5.5 -98.9 -72.3
ordinary balance ratio 87.4% 85.92 3.61% Souces : Banking bureau of MOF 'Annual reports' various years.
Takugin's share of idle money -1.0%
Takugin's share of securities invested 3.4%
Takugin's share of deposits 3.2%
Takugin's share of loans 3.0%  
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